December 6, 2024

International Politics and Conflict Resolution

Bernardo Teles Fazendeiro

The Russian Orthodox Church (IOR), or perhaps more specifically, the Moscow Patriarchate, is one of the most widely recognised religious institutions of Orthodox Christianity in the Russian Federation and the world. Everything physical only has meaning through the social, just as physical space only gains meaning through social space. Realising the geopolitical changes resulting from the Soviet collapse, and more recently with the war in Ukraine, many academics and experts on religion have argued that the church has positioned itself in a way to have an influence on Russia's internal affairs and foreign policy, remaining a "right-hand" of the Kremlin. Others claim that the situation is much more ambiguous and that the IOR is divided into at least three competing internal lines that compete for power and influence in the direction of the Church, some of which advocate independence from the Kremlin. While I agree with both of the above perspectives, there seems to be a major gap in all the literature: delineating the space of the IOR. My argument is that we need to ask ourselves what is the nature of the space in which the IOR operationalises its internal and external policy. Analysing this operationalisation in sacred and non-sacred space is essential to understanding why the Russian Federation stopped obeying Westphalian space and started following the goal of sacred space. The superimposition of sacred space on Westphalian space is the key to understanding Moscow's rhetorical justifications on the contemporary stage, especially after the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as well as allowing us to reflect on the predictability of the new dynamics that may emerge between religion and international politics.

Keywords: Russian Orthodox Church, Russian Federation, Westphalian Space, Sacred Space, Ukraine